








It is well known that the importance that economists have attributed to the not easily defined phenomenon that is referred to by the term “externalities” has widely fluctuated over the last century. Perceived of as a kind of curiosity before World War II, it became a pervasive object of discussion for economists in the fifties and sixties; thereafter, while remaining often discussed during the seventies, the question of the very nature of the concept of externality progressively ceased to be a passionately debated topic sometime during the eighties, even though this concept, given its close association with many important questions such as the question of pollution, has remained frequently referred to since then. One might be astonished by this fluctuating evolution, but the latter can easily be understood if it is admitted that the concept of externality is what I call a residual concept (or a counter-concept), meaning by this that the term “externality” designates nothing but a residual entity which does not correspond to an autonomous phenomenon, but rather to what is left aside by a more basic entity which, incidentally, occupies the central place in economics, namely the market.​[1]​ Put otherwise, if the content attributed to the concept of externality has fluctuated in such a way, it is because the extension attributed to the concept of market — which is in this case the commanding entity — has itself fluctuated in the reverse direction. As a by-product of this analysis, an explanation of the fact that it is so difficult to formulate a satisfactory definition of an externality will be provided. Indeed, such a residual phenomenon can hardly be defined specifically; it must, rather, be defined negatively by the absence of one or another of the traits that are associated with markets. And defining a phenomenon in such a fashion opens up the possibility of focussing on as many ways as markets have traits whichever one may choose to emphasise. 
Therefore, even though many analyses of externalities have already been published, it may be worthwhile to develop this view a bit more regarding its residual character. In order to clarify the consequences of the later, the present paper will recall the evolution of the way this concept was perceived during three successive periods, namely the one in which it appeared as a relatively marginal phenomenon (first section), the one in which it was presented as pervasive (second section) and the one in which the role of costs of transaction was emphasised (third section). A fourth section will draw on some unexpected consequences of this analysis. In each of these periods, it is the antithetical way in which the notions of externality is related to the notion of market that will be discussed in order to put forward the relation that holds between fluctuations in the content attributed to the concept of externality and fluctuations, in the reverse direction, in the extension attributed to the concept of market. 
1) Externalities conceived of as curiosities
To start with, it is important to recall that a market is a constructed institution, which was progressively developed throughout history. Before the organisation of these markets, nomads who exhausted a rich orchard by exploiting it with their herds did not have to compensate anyone for spoiling their vital resources. And inventors of new ways of solving problems could hardly see their labour, patience and skill be fairly compensated by their imitators. Various types of property rights and of physical and legal means of appropriation had to be developed in order to allow efficient markets to be stabilised. No doubt that in their absence, it was unavoidable that, in most occupations, a part of the product of the labour of someone  as Arthur Pigou would have said if he had described this situation  “instead of coming to this person, came, as a positive or negative item, to other people”. Clearly, in such a situation, a number of activities escaped the reach of the slowly emerging markets. However, they could not generate “externalities”, because there were no clearly circumscribed markets in relation to which they could be said to be external. 
However, by the turn of the 20th Century, economists, who were not surrounded like we are by problems related to pollution and allocation of public goods, were generally fascinated by the continuous expansion of the markets and confident that their models of the market were designed to capture any kind of economic transaction. Given this spectacular development of markets, it was difficult indeed to be bothered much by the fact that a few human activities could hardly be integrated into the market. It is true that Arthur Pigou, in his Economics of Welfare, insisted on the “divergences between marginal social net product and marginal private net product,”​[2]​ and abundantly illustrated this phenomenon. However, even though Pigou’s approach to this question remained the standard view on this matter for a long time, many economists considered the phenomenon somewhat exotic and not important enough to seriously reduce the confidence that an apparently omnipresent market instilled in them. More precisely, any activity that did not fit in the idea of a market was either translated into an idealised market-friendly version or was judged not significant enough to be considered by many of them. 
It is true that the third of the three types of examples provided by Pigou, which concerned typical economic activities involving increasing or decreasing costs, bothered economists enough to be at the origin of a debate  the so-called debate about the “empty” boxes of increasing and decreasing costs  among the most theoretically minded of them.  This debate, however, can be seen as an enterprise to save the market from threatening situations characterised by the fact that a quite regular trade between two people has positive or negative consequences for other people engaged in the same industry. Such a situation seemed to mean that this third party would get a benefit without cost or would suffer inconveniencies without compensation, which seems to imply that the market does not play its role in such a case. Should such activities be treated as external to the market? After all, the expansion of an industry — which is out of the control of a firm and, in this sense, “external” to it — can increase the cost of some factors already employed by the firm and constitute a “diseconomy” for this firm, just like other situations can decrease these costs and constitute an economy for it. However, as was claimed by Ellis and Fellner in the conclusion of this debate, “if the expansion of an industry gives a factor a higher per unit remuneration [...] the units already being supplied earn producer's rents [...] and rent is not a cost in social resources.”​[3]​ In such a situation, no extra cost is incurred by society as a whole and, consequently, there is no reason to diagnose a divergence between marginal social net product and marginal private net product. Rent being an accepted market phenomena, windfall gains or losses realised due to moves that are out of control in another part of the economy are included in the normal working of the market, which means that the alleged externalities must be internalised. Put otherwise, the ground occupied by externalities of this kind was conquered by the market and reintegrated into it.
However, this argumentation was based on a distinction that was progressively made clear through the contributions of Knight (1924), Viner (1931) and Ellis & Fellner (1943) between pecuniary and technological externalities. This distinction was crucial because the internalisation in the market of situations characterised by an apparent divergence between social and private products was meaningful only when the so-called “pecuniary externalities” were involved. Consequently, other kinds of divergences were still resistant to internalisation. It was mostly those pinpointed by Pigou in his second type of uncompensated services or disservices: those associated with lighthouses, parks, public transport, deforestation, lamps at front doors of houses, smoke from factory chimneys, scientific research, spoiling of houses' environment by neighbouring factories, wearing out of the surface of roads by motor cars, commerce of intoxicants, etc. These phenomena were not internalised in the market, but most of them were not considered worthy of much attention from economists who published in this period. This perception of technological externalities as relatively inoffensive curiosities was still present when J.E. Meade published his famous 1952 paper featuring bees as sources of typical externalities since they contribute to fecund neighbouring orchards without any market transactions between bee raisers and apple growers. 
2) The pervasiveness of externalities
In fact the term “externality”, which, apparently, was first coined by Paul Samuelson in the fifties, did not exist during any of the periods considered above,​[4]​ even though the phenomenon designated by this term was present in spite of being relatively ignored or, more typically, reduced to not really significant exceptions to the proper workings of a market. In any case, in the fifties the situation changed dramatically.​[5]​ Before illustrating this fact, let us note that externalities found not only a name but also a formal representation. As is well known, in standard microeconomic notations, any agent can be represented by a utility function and any firm by a production function. The independent variables of such functions are various commodities (or factors). But, if the latter are unpaid while being independent variables, it is important to distinguish them from paid commodities (or factors). According to Tibor Scitovsky, this is done with the help of functions such as the following one: x1 = F (l1, c1, ... ;  x2, l2, ...) in which x1 stands for output of firm 1, l1 and c1 for its factors of production and x2 and “l2, ...” for output and factors of production of another firm. According to Scitovsky, in this function,  “the existence of external economies is indicated by the presence of the variables to the right of the semicolon.”​[6]​, which correspond to unpaid commodities (or factors). Thus, the instrument  which turned out to be a crucial element in the economics of externalities   that was chosen to help emphasise this situation is the semicolon. 
In fact this instrument is perfectly adapted to illustrating what I want to put forward in this paper: the inverted fluctuations of the respective concepts of market and externality. When activities that cannot be internalised in the market are involved, corresponding variables in relevant functions are literally pushed to the right of the semicolon (where, more typically, parameters are located) in order to clearly illustrate the fact that, while they are playing some role in the economy corresponding to their role in this function, they cannot be considered parts of the market. According to E.J. Mishan, for example, “the external effects in production may be exhibited by a production function of the form   x = x(a1, ...am ; ãn, ...,ãw) where x is output, a1,…am, the priced inputs, and ãn,…,ãw, the unpriced inputs”.​[7]​ In this manner, it was made graphically clear that externalities are nothing but a name given to residual economic activities that are left outside the market, “to the right of the semicolon.” 
But why should those activities of consumption or of production be excluded from the market? Clearly, because they do not command meaningful prices or costs, which are the essential feature of any activity in a market. But why are they denied this feature? Since Pigou’s somewhat ambivalent suggestions in this sense or, at the very least, since Ellis and Fellner’s classic paper of 1943, which attributed externalities to “the divorce of scarcity from effective ownership,” (1943, p.  262) it was usual to associate externalities with the fact that some commodities cannot be appropriated and consequently cannot be exchanged at a price in a market. Bee raisers indeed could hardly appropriate the fruitful product of bees’ activity. But it seems reasonable to claim that any commodity can be appropriated in a way or another with the help of more and more ingenious means of appropriation. Radio waves can be privatised with the help of scrambling devices and even new ideas and inventions can be more or less efficiently appropriated with the help of patents and copyrights. These goods seem to be internalised this way, but could one really say that they are internalised into the market if the consequence of their alleged internalisation is the destruction of the virtues attributed to the market? Let us see in what sense.
For neoclassical economists of this period, a market was characterized by reference to the paradigms of perfect competition, which was supposed to be conducive to general equilibrium. This perfectionist view of the market was endorsed by some of the economists who became particularly attentive to the quickly rising concern about public goods, which draw a lot of attention in the fifties, and about pollution (and ecology), which significantly imposed itself, almost for the first time, in the sixties. Francis Bator was clearly representative of this approach. Bator considered that “the inability of a producer of a good or service physically to exclude users” (Bator, 1958, p. 361, note 8) was a very poor criterion for detecting an externality since he was convinced that “‘exclusion’ is almost never impossible.” (1958, p. 374) Indeed, fences, scrambling devices and other gadgets can usually exclude successfully, but such exclusions fail lamentably when the goal is to reach the Pareto-efficient solution that the market is supposed to provide. When such means of appropriation are resorted to, Bator observes, “there is no price which will efficiently mediate both supply and demand.” (1958, p. 362, note 9) Therefore, Bator and his followers found it appropriate to broaden the meaning of the term “externality”. So, not only typical activities associated with lack of ownership (illustrated by Meade's unpaid apple-blossom or by externalities associated with water and fishery) (Bator, 1958, p. 363-365) were considered as externalities, but also “technical externalities” (illustrated by cases of nonconvexities produced either by indivisibility or even by any structural problems causing monopoly behaviour or misallocation of useful resources), (Bator, 1958, p. 365-369) and equally “public good externalities” (associated with most kinds of publicness, joint consumption, non-revelation of preferences, etc.). (Bator, 1958, p. 3669-371) Put in a nutshell, externalities were identified everywhere any form of “market failure” to reach a Pareto-efficient solution was detected. This was hardly surprising. A market that is so restrictively defined necessarily had to exclude a lot of activities that clearly did not meet its requirements and, consequently, had to be declared external to such a market.
A few years later, E.J. Mishan similarly proposed the following definition of externalities: “external effects may be said to arise when relevant effects on production or welfare go wholly or partially unpriced.” (Mishan, 1965, pp. 6; emphasis added) However, he adds a little further that some of the “unpriced” goods, responsible for such external effects, “may be positively priced albeit inadequately.” (Ibidem) In order to illustrate such a case of inadequate pricing, let me use an example that was frequently referred to in various contexts. Rather than being excluded from the consumption of bridge services, individuals, thanks to efficient fences and perception systems, can be charged for using them. But, what is an “adequate” price for a service like that of a bridge, which is provided in a situation of increasing return or even in a situation of practically zero marginal cost? If, in conformity with the standard theory, the price charged corresponded to the marginal cost and accordingly was practically zero, such a service would be “partially unpriced” in the sense that it would not cover the fixed costs of providing it. And if an attempt is made to cover all costs, no appropriate toll could be theoretically determined and, at the very least, the service would be “inadequately priced”. Thus, according to Mishan's definition, externalities are also present each time a service, like the service provided by a bridge, is “positively priced” but not priced “adequately.” For Mishan, as for Bator, externalities were necessarily pervasive because so many economic activities could not be included in a market understood as a perfectly competitive structure conducive to general equilibrium, as neoclassical economists characterised it. Perfection being practically unattainable, the market was reduced to a very little thing, or more precisely to an idealised pole around which the actual economic world was constituted by residual activities to which the laws of well behaved markets were not applicable. Externalities had invaded the ground occupied by numerous activities that used to go on in markets previously deemed to be efficient enough in spite of their acknowledged imperfection. Even when the so-called ownership externalities were involved, it was judged misleading to attribute this situation to “the divorce of scarcity from effective ownership.” Indeed, means of appropriation were more efficient than ever before, but when commodities dealt with are not perfectly divisible, strictly homogeneous and easily exchangeable, ownership is not sufficient to actualise the promises of the market. If the market is obstinately associated with its idealised version, market failures will be detected everywhere, and externalities will necessarily be pervasive.
3) The role of the transaction costs
The oscillating cycle in the definition and the scope of the notion of externality had reached the point where its content was maximal because too many activities failed the test required for being qualified as internal to such an idealised market. However, this situation changed, a second time but in opposite direction, by the end of the sixties. This was surely not due to a dramatic reduction in the level of pollution or in the importance of public goods.  The economic significance of both of these phenomena was actually increasing during the last decades of the twentieth century.  Clearly the decisive factor in this change observed in the perception of externalities was due to a significant change in the perception of the market. What was changed was the view according to which the market was unfit to deal with these phenomena that were considered as externalities. In fact, the air of change came from Chicago. It is well known that the neoliberal vision of the market profoundly differs from the standard neoclassical vision oriented towards the perspective of general equilibrium. Perfect competition, as the paradigm of the market, was replaced by a reinterpreted version of laissez-faire. Far from being perceived of as “market failures,” monopolistic situations were considered by Milton Friedman as a normal manifestation of a healthy market. For him, the only kind of monopoly inimical to the market was the monopoly created and/or supported by the State. Instead of relying on the State to intervene in order to transform the market in such a way that it becomes as similar as possible to models of perfect competition, neoliberal economists were typically opposed to almost any kind of State intervention and claimed that the market was nothing but a place where transactions are freely going on irrespective of eventual development of phenomena such as monopoly, coalitions, misallocations, joint consumption, etc. which, for Bator, were indisputable market failures.
In this context, most examples of externalities enumerated by Bator and Mishan could easily be internalised; but what about the most typical cases of externalities such as those associated with pollution, which were generally presented either as ownership or as technological externalities? Obviously, the phenomena that they designate have remained, up to now, a preoccupation for economists as well as for everybody else, but the idea that it constitutes the case of an externality that cannot be internalised progressively lost its grip on the economists, at least on those who became followers of Ronald Coase’s approach. This profound change was largely due to the influence exerted by Coase seminal 1960 paper on social costs. In fact, Coase never used the term “externality” in this paper and it is only after many publications inspired by Coase’s approach that the concept of externality, while remaining a useful instrument of analysis, progressively ceased to be an indefeasible conceptual problem for those who were heartily defending the virtues of the market. 
As is well known, Coase's contribution was to emphasise the role of transaction costs by carefully analyzing what would happen in their hypothetical absence. The main result of this analysis was the famous “Coase's theorem.” The demonstration of this theorem is straightforward. Given the hypothesis of zero transaction costs and admitting that economic agents are perfectly rational, it makes no difference, when it comes to the optimal allocation of resources, whether the rights favour a polluter or those who suffer from the pollution. The idea is that the same result will be obtained in both situations, since both parties will ultimately be led to a unique optimal agreement. For example, suppose that an industrialist operating on the shore of a river finds it advantageous to dispose of his garbage in the river and, by polluting this way, contaminates the water in which bathers down the river would like to swim. And suppose that it can be established that the benefit from the easy disposal of garbage is greater than the benefit that the bathers derive from clean water, but that, beyond a certain amount of pollution, the benefit lost by the bathers becomes larger than the extra benefit the polluter gains by polluting still more extensively. On the one hand, if the law is against the industrialist, then the polluter will negotiate with the bathers and buy some “optimal” amount of pollution rights from them. By hypothesis, they will accept compensation up to the point where they would start to suffer more from pollution than they could benefit from the compensation the polluter is ready to offer them. On the other hand, if the law is against the bathers who suffer from the water pollution, then it would be in the latter’s interest to bribe the polluter into reducing the amount of pollution which he creates to the same “optimal” level as in the previous case and it would be in the interest of the polluter to accept such a bribe and reduce pollution to this optimal level. Naturally, such a conclusion is purely theoretical since, according to Coase himself, (1960, p. 15) transaction costs are highly significant in such situations. Collecting payments from those who suffer from the pollution and preventing some of them from cheating by not revealing their true preferences would involve, if feasible at all, tremendous costs indeed. However, far from suggesting that the paralyzing effect of such costs could be easily overcome, Coase’s claim was that these important costs must be accounted for in the normal calculations made in a market.
But what is the impact of these conclusions on the nature of externalities? Two economists directly influenced by Coase have strongly contributed to voiding this concept of its meaning by dramatically inflating the extension of what is understood as a market activity.  Recall that the advocates of markets in the first part of the 20th century have reduced the role of externalities by internalising pecuniary externalities after distinguishing them from technological externalities and concluding that only the latter were genuine externalities. In a paper written in 1964, Harold Demsetz did not hesitate, for his part, to discount any difference between these two types of “side effects,” the phrase that he preferred to substitute for the term “externality.” (Demsetz, 1964, p. 11) Comparing side effects of the technological type to what he calls “primary” effects  which are nothing but typical market interrelations, or what, in another context, would have been called “pecuniary effects” , Demsetz concluded that “there exist no qualitative differences” between these two types of effects, the only differences being “those that are implicitly based on quantitative differences in exchange and police cost,”​[8]​ or, in a more general term, in transaction costs. To illustrate his point, Demsetz uses the following example. “Suppose a factory invents a new more efficient furnace which can burn a cheaper grade of coal than can existing furnaces. The burning of cheap coal, we will assume, dirties homes in the neighborhood.” (Demsetz, 1964, p. 25) No doubt this “side effect” corresponds to a typical technological externality, but for Demsetz the only important point is that it reduces “the wealth of nearby homeowners.” However, Demsetz continues, “if this same factory, by virtue of its new furnace, successfully forces a nearby competing firm out of business, and if the resulting decline in demand for housing reduces the wealth of neighborhood homeowners, we do not become concerned.” Indeed, this last situation corresponds to a typically internal market or pecuniary effect. Thus, Demsetz raises the question: “Why the difference in our attitudes toward these two situations which have the same effect on homeowners?” In the case of demand for housing, Demsetz explains, we feel that “a smoothly operating market” (1964, p. 26) will maximize wealth. If, in contrast, we cannot rely on an existing market in the smoke case, it is because “the cost of exchanging and policing smoke contracts” (the transaction costs) are too high “relative to the benefits of marketing smoke.” Following Coase, Demsetz observes that “[I]f the costs of exchanging and policing smoke contracts were zero (and if the costs of exchanging houses were zero) there would be no reason for distinguishing between the two cases insofar as ‘remedial’ action is concerned.” (ibidem) In the case of smoke nuisance, the fact that costs are far from being zero excludes the presence of an actual market, but does not exclude the presence of a “potential market” which, according to Demsetz, “stands ready.” (ibidem) However, referring to such a potential market is tantamount to claiming that, in principle, all transactions might be totally accounted for by the market and that, consequently, there would no longer be room for externalities. Indeed, either the smoke level and the values of the houses are actually regulated by the market according to all costs implied, or the smoke level is left unreduced and the values of the houses decline accordingly, because it is made clear by a potential market that controlling the smoke level this way would be prohibitive, given the costs involved (transaction costs included). In the first case, there would be, by hypothesis, no externality, and in the second case, if one accepts considering the potential market as a market, there would be none either. Inflated to the point of including such potential markets, what would be called “the market” would leave very little ground indeed for activities external to its enlarged scope, to externalities.​[9]​ 

It was this last conclusion that was to be made still more explicit and pushed to its extreme limit in a paper published in 1979 by Carl Dahlman. Once transaction costs have been placed on the same footing as the usual production and transportation costs, it seems normal to raise the same question that is raised concerning these familiar costs. Why incur these costs if they are themselves larger than the benefits to be derived from an eventual transaction? After all, you might dream of owning a Mercedes, but if you consider that the costs involved (which in this case are mostly production costs) are higher than the benefits expected from owning such a car, you could decide not to realize this dream without concluding that renouncing that transaction creates a non Pareto-optimal situation. Dahlman’s contribution consists in applying such a consideration to transaction costs. After all, an ideal world without transaction costs is just as unattainable as an ideal world without production costs. (Dahlman,  1979, p. 153) Therefore, when assessing the optimality of a situation, one must take into account that our world “is plagued with various kinds of transaction costs” (p. 152) and admit that “it may be too costly to eliminate all externalities” (p. 153). This conclusion seems to make sense, but Dahlman continues by saying that “we should preserve some of them [externalities] in order to reach an optimum” and explains that in spite of the presence of these externalities, which would be eliminated in an ideal world, the “transaction-cost-constrained equilibrium” is precisely what “ought to be the attainable optimum that we should strive to achieve.” (ibidem) An odd consequence of this is that, once all transactions costs have been taken into account, almost any static situation will look optimal.  If no transaction is going on to improve a situation, it is tempting to conclude that it is because the costs of an eventual transaction (for example, the cost of organizing and monitoring would-be traders) added to the payment involved in those eventual transactions make it unprofitable. If, for example, our industrialist persists in polluting the river even when the nuisance to bathers is greater than the benefit to the industry of using this polluting technique, it is, in one sense, because the “transaction costs” (the cost of organizing the bathers, of forcing them to reveal their true preferences and of collecting the amount required to convince the industrialist to reduce his operations, etc.) would be so great that, added to the amount of the bribe itself, it would exceed the potential benefit to the bathers. As Dahlman puts it “if it is too costly to eliminate, the side effect is optimal.” (p. 154) 

In such conditions, the concept of an externality clearly becomes meaningless. An all-inclusive concept of the market would be capable of absorbing all forms of human interaction. Any potential externality could or could not be eliminated by some type of negotiation involving costs. In the first case, by hypothesis, there would no longer be an externality; in the second case, the failure to eliminate the putative externality would simply be due to the absence of trade given excessive economic (transaction) costs on the potential market, but there would be no effective externality in this case either.  Thus, according to such a notion of an all inclusive market, there would be no more reason to identify an externality in this pollution case than in the fact that, because of its high production cost, you refrain from buying the Mercedes you might dream of owning.

The “best of all possible worlds”
Along such lines of argument, one could arrive at the conclusion that any situation might be declared optimal since any possible improvement would have been implemented were its costs (including transaction costs) low enough to make it socially profitable. Mishan anticipated this conclusion with apprehension when he wrote a rather ironic paper entitled “Pangloss on Pollution” (1971b). The reference to Dr. Pangloss, the champion of “the best of all possible worlds” in Voltaire's Candide, was to suggest how the inclusion of transaction costs can dramatically change the analysis of pollution and translate into an optimal situation what was considered as one of the most serious challenges to the alleged structuring virtues of the market. It might even be possible to push the matter further and, as I claimed in an earlier paper (Lagueux, 1998), to conclude that such an argument could make any situation whatsoever optimal. Any dictatorial government, even of a type particularly inimical to liberty, could be justified by an extension of Dahlman’s argument. Dictatorial governmental activities interfere significantly with the consumption functions of its citizens by restricting their individual liberty. However, if the inconvenience suffered by these citizens was really that important, they could bribe the government to reduce its liberty-limiting activities to an optimal amount.​[10]​ If they do not attempt to bribe the government, it is clearly because such transactions would involve costs (information costs, organization costs, decision making costs and monitoring costs) which would be much higher than the benefits expected. On this ground, it would make sense, according to a Dahlmanian approach, to characterize the situation in this dictatorial country as optimal as it is! Naturally, one might object to such an application of this theory of the market to a political (as opposed to an economic) situation. However, one may answer that the actual relation between an industrialist and the neighbouring bathers is not a typically economic relation, and consequently, it is not clear that alleged economic and political situations are really as different as might first be thought. After all, a number of prisoners successfully manage to bribe their jailers. And, who would deny that the application of economic analysis to political situations is one of the major contributions of recent economics? 

In any case, the goal of this example was only to show that, when inflated as it tends to be by Dahlman’s approach, the concept of the market risks not only voiding the concept of externality of its meaning, but even risks threatening its own meaning, not only because it might legitimise the very negation of freedom on which it is based, but because, to remain meaningful, it needs to be opposed to something outside itself. How should one decide whether an externality exist or not in this context? The solution is to reject the approach adopted by Demsetz and Dahlman and to consider only the inclusion in actual markets and not in potential or ideal markets when it comes to internalising externalities. Otherwise, nothing can avoid being internalised, since potential markets can be invoked at will. However, adopting this criterion raises its own problems. Should we diagnose externalities when actions based on transactions taking place in an actual market have some impact on the utility function of people that are not part of those transactions? Suppose you have a house with a beautiful view and that I buy the land in front of it in order to build a high-rise building that will spoil your view, should this be considered an externality in spite of the fact that everything was done inside a strictly actual market for land and real estate? It seems probable that most economists would answer yes, some of them even claiming that this case is a typical example of an externality. But, if instead of building a high-rise, I just paint my house black, which makes you very sad each time you look out your window, I suppose that, using the same criterion, an externality should be diagnosed in this case as well. But if the colour of my suits or my way of speaking affects your utility function, the same criterion would lead us to describe the situation as illustrative of a “typical” externality here again. Externalities would be everywhere, risking the loss of their specific meaning. More precisely, such a concept might possibly describe particular ethical relations, but would loose any properly economic meaning. And distinguishing the case of the high rise building and the case of the unpleasant suits should not be made by invoking an arbitrary frontier that is not based on a piece of theory, because this would make the concept formally untreatable, something that economists could not accept. 

My suggestion for solving this conundrum is to keep the criterion for being a genuine externality that I have advocated, namely the fact of being outside the market. However, this criterion cannot be applied without clarifying the relation between potential and actual markets. Let us admit that there is an externality when activities affecting other parties concern commodities or services that, for being of interest to anybody, might be regulated by a potential market that “stands ready” (to use Demsetz’s phrase), but remain outside (external to) any actual market. Regarding my example of a view, it is far from clear that the fact that I bought a piece of land gives me a property right over the air space that commands neighbouring views. What is clear is that rights to build at such or such a height (provided by permits) cannot be considered as equivalent to a free market for views open to all interested neighbours. No one has the legal capacity to buy such a piece of air in order to use it in one’s preferred way. Thus, there is no actual market for views, even though a potential market for this precious commodity “stands ready”. For a particularly telling example of a similar case, think of an eventual market for silence whose absence has suggested various considerations to Mishan (1967). Given the absence of an actual market, noise produced by neighbours can be considered as an externality, even though a potential market for silence is perfectly conceivable. 

Now, what about the case of unpleasant suits? There is a market for suits, but the very idea of a market for the pleasure provided by other people’s suits seems absurd since such a “market”, which would determine the kind of suit that one has to wear to please any person to be met, could not be disentangled from a market for suits taking into account the eventual gains or costs associated with the quite hypothetical payments of those interested in buying this odd “commodity”. Such a hypothetical but not even potential market is far from standing ready. The same can be said of a market for the pleasure provided by the colours or the shapes of other people’s houses. For sure, a deal is conceivable between two people (you pay me if I accept to paint my house in a colour that you find pleasant), but this kind of trade of houses’ colours and shapes cannot be generalised in a market where all colours and shapes of houses would be determined in such a fashion, because such a highly hypothetical market could not be disentangled from the market for houses. Since there is not even a potential market for such pleasures, whose actual counterpart could sensibly be said to be absent, their privation could hardly be considered to be resulting from an externality. This situation contrasts with the one concerning markets for views or for silence for which a potential market “stands ready”. It is true that one might argue that markets for views could hardly be conceived, given the fact that views are not available to any places, especially in a city where multiple high rise towers are mutually blocking their views, but markets for rare commodities such as coastal lands exist, and their effect — which incidentally may be judged undesirable — is to reduce the number of eventual entrants in such a market.

One might still object that an independent market for neighbouring house’s colour might nonetheless be conceived while not actualised, but my point is not to trace an implausible hard and fast line between potential markets and a zone where it is no longer possible to refer to markets or to externalities. My point is rather that claiming that an externality exist in a given situation is tantamount to saying that such a potential market “stands ready” whereas no actual market really exist to deal with this case. It is the fact that potential markets for the involved commodities fails to be actualised that allows economists to refer to high-rise buildings and to noise as externalities.​[11]​ Put otherwise, being theoretically “traded” on a potential market is not sufficient for “commodities” (affecting other parties’ utility function) such as views, freedom, rights to avoid smoke nuisance or rights to pollute (in the case of bathers versus industrialists) to be said internalised; therefore, corresponding situations can be said to be externalities. Being internalised should mean actually being traded on an actual market, in such a way that the externality is actually eliminated. Incidentally, that seems to be the only useful theoretical role of the notion of potential markets: they cannot internalise externalities (as actual markets can), but they determine what phenomena (affecting other parties) should be considered externalities, namely those for which they stand ready. 

Thus, an externality can be understood as a residual concept whose content depends on the content of the concept of a market. Therefore it is not surprising that rising critiques of the neoliberal encompassing view of the market have contributed to promote a new interest in this concept. Moreover, the loss of credibility undergone by this neoliberal approach in the context of the present financial turmoil and economic crisis might favour a deflation of the concept of a market to more realistic (and actualisable) proportions. It is a bit too soon to arrive at a sure conclusion on this point, but it is probable that if this happens, the concept of an externality, which is already frequently referred to, especially in the context of the rising interest in ecological questions, will be mobilised more and more by eventual discussions about the scope of the market that it so usefully circumscribes.​[12]​ 
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^1	  It might be interesting to note that, in a different context, Ayres and Kneese (1969) have used the word “residuals” to characterise not the concept of externality, but material pollutants themselves.
^2	  Pigou 1962, p. 172 and ff.  In fact, Pigou  had been predated on this ground by  Henry Sidgwick who in  his Principles of Political Economy (1887) referred also to a "divergence between private and public interest" (quoted by Laffont 1977, p. 14). For an analysis of the role of Sidgwick in heralding such divergences and even of Mill who, more timidly, anticipated the problem, see Medema (2006); see also O’Donnell (1979).
^3	  Ellis  &  Fellner 1943, p. 247;  Frank Knight had previously argued by invoking  such a rent in his famous discussion of the traffic example, cf. Knight 1924, pp. 162-163.
^4	  The adjective “external” was much older since it was abundantly used by Marshall himself when referring to external economies in his Principles (for example, Marshall 1949 [1890], pp. 221, 230, 262, 381, etc.); it is the substantive “externality”, which derives from the former, that was coined in the nineteen fifties, but, in contrast with the adjective, the substantive was used to cover all phenomena of the type referred to in the present paper. 
^5	  For a more detailed discussion of these opposed views, see Lagueux 1998.
^6	  Scitovsky 1954, p. 145. Scitovsky pretends to “reproduce” Meade’s definition without referring to any specific paper. However Scitovsky’s formula is simpler than Meade’s, which, at least in his famous 1952 paper, does not use the semicolon as such. 
^7	  Mishan 1965,  pp.  6; see also Mishan's survey paper for the Journal of Economic Literature, Mishan 1971a, p. 2.
^8	  Demsetz 1964, p. 25, emphasis added. Demsetz had devoted the two main sections of this paper to analyse what he calls respectively “exchange cost” and “police cost” which correspond to two kinds of costs referred to by Coase in his paper on social cost.
^9	   In another paper (1967), Demsetz refers to externality described as “an ambiguous concept” (p. 348), but it is to maintain that a “primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities. (ibidem)
^10	  In fact, Demsetz come very close to such a view when he discusses the case of slave labour (1967, p. 348-349) ; considerations by his discussant can be read on pp. 375-376.
^11	  Arrow (1969, p. 59) uses the phrase “failures of markets to exist” in the context of his own interpretation of the relation between externalities and market failures. It would be interesting but out of the scope of the present paper to compare his views on this point to the one that I am defending.
^12	  The author is grateful to Spencer Banzhaf, Élodie Bertrand, William Colish, Ephraim Kleiman, Aviva Shiller and the two anonymous reviewers of European Journal of the History of Economic Thought for their useful comments and SSHRC (Ottawa) for financial assistance.
